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 This Article revisits and refines the organizing principles of evidence law: 
case specificity, cost minimization, and equal best. These three principles 
explain and justify all admissibility and sufficiency requirements of the law 
of evidence. The case-specificity principle requires that factfinders base their 
decisions on the relative plausibility of the stories describing the parties’ 
entitlement–accountability relationship. The cost-minimization principle 
demands that factfinders minimize the cost of errors and the cost of avoiding 
errors as a total sum. The equal-best principle mandates that factfinders 
afford every person the maximal feasible protection against risk of error 
while equalizing that protection across the board.  
 This Article connects these principles to the irreducibly second-personal 
structure of legal doctrine (that tracks Stephen Darwall’s celebrated account 
of morally justified claims). Under this structure, the plaintiff ’s (or the 
prosecutor’s) authority to extract compensation from (or impose punishment 
on) the defendant critically depends on the trustworthiness of the individual 
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School Symposium on New Doctrinalism and the Northwestern University School of Law 
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infringement allegations that make the defendant accountable to the plaintiff 
(or the prosecutor). Evidentiary rules fit into this second-personal 
framework only when they promote case specificity, cost minimization, or 
equal best. Reform proposals that favor different rules are fatally 
disconnected from that framework and are therefore ill-conceived.  
 Based on this observation, I criticize three powerful accounts of evidence 
law that rely, respectively, on economics, probability theory, and morality. 
These accounts include Louis Kaplow’s theory of the burden of proof, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s claim that factfinders’ deviations from 
mathematical probability are irrational, and Ronald Dworkin’s distinction 
between accidentally and deliberately imposed risks of error. These accounts 
break away from our second-personal system of entitlements and liabilities; 
by doing so, they create a methodologically impermissible disconnect between 
rules of evidence and substantive laws. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the twentieth century, the realist theories of law came to 
occupy a dominant position in contemporary jurisprudence. Those theories 
are diverse. Yet, all of them coalesce around a robust proposition that denies 
the existence of distinctly legal reasoning. According to those theories, 
reasoning that takes place in courts of law is not “legal” in any distinctive 
sense. Rather, it consists of moral, political, economic, epistemic, and 
psychological claims. These claims are pursued by litigants and subsequently 
validated or rejected by courts. Formally, they allude to applicable legal 
rules and the underlying facts, but the actual meaning of those rules and 
facts is determined by reasons that are external to the law. The reasons that 
actually determine what the applicable rules say and what the underlying 
facts are come from morality, politics, economics, epistemology, and 
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psychology. They use legal vocabulary but do not derive from the law. 
Consequently, so goes the argument, law cannot be considered a self-
contained practice and autonomous discipline. As some uncompromising 
Realists and critical legal scholars put it, “law is an empty vessel.”1 
In the pages ahead, I set forth and explain my profound disagreement 
with this argument. Realists correctly perceive law as a combined product of 
moral, political, economic, epistemic, and other societally relevant ideas. 
These ideas are vital for all forms of social organization, including law. Prior 
to going into law, however, these ideas undergo selection, adjustment, and 
integration by the lawmaker: the legislature or a superior common law 
court. The lawmaker uses these ideas to formulate its goals and to devise 
rules that realize those goals. As part of that process, it adopts certain ideas 
while leaving other ideas out. The lawmaker then integrates the selected 
ideas and writes them into rules that regulate primary activities, 
adjudication, and courts’ decisions.  
This process of selection, adjustment, and integration is guided by the 
lawmaker’s reasons.2 These reasons are distinctively “legal” because they 
perform a critical organizing role in determining the contents of the legal 
system.3 They select the moral, economic, epistemic, and other socially 
relevant ideas that go into the law and translate them into rules.4 In what 
follows, I identify these reasons as “organizing principles.”  
Organizing principles lie at the heart of the “New Doctrinalism”—
theorizing about the actual practice of the law, which is predominantly 
doctrinal.5 Full explication of these principles’ characteristics requires an 
extensive philosophical investigation, which I cannot carry out in this 
Article. The conveners of this Symposium asked me to explore the 
relationship between the New Doctrinalism and the law of evidence, and I 
now begin this exploration.  
This Article proceeds in the following order. In Part I, I outline the 
organizing principles of evidence law, explain their connection to specific 
evidentiary rules and substantive law, and identify the constraints they 
impose on normative theories of evidence. In Parts II, III, and IV, I criticize 
economic, probabilistic, and moral theories of evidence that proceed in 
 
1 ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 90 (1990) 
(noting that some critical legal scholars perceive legal rules as “‘empty vessels’ into which 
individuals can pour virtually any content they please”). 
2 See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119-21, 149 (2011) (identifying lawmakers’ rules and 
reasons as “plans”). 
3 Id. at 225-30 (explaining why plans underlying lawmaker’s rules are distinctly “legal”). 
4 Id. at 231-33. 
5 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreword, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2015). 
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isolation from those principles and ignore the constraints they impose. A 
short Conclusion follows.  
I. ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
In the paragraphs ahead, I identify three organizing principles of 
evidence law.6 These principles originate from epistemology, economics, 
and morality. The first and most fundamental of the three is epistemic: it 
requires that courts decide cases on the basis of case-specific evidence, as 
opposed to generalizations and statistical distributions.7 The second 
principle is economic: it requires that court procedures and decisions 
minimize, simultaneously, the cost of error in factfinding and the cost of 
avoiding that error.8 The third principle is moral: it requires that courts 
afford every person the maximal feasible protection against adjudicative 
error and that this protection be equal for all parties in civil trials and across 
all criminal defendants (“equal best”).9  
These principles explain and justify the existing allocation of the 
burdens of proof, admissibility rules, and corroboration requirements. All 
evidentiary rules, except privileges, are geared toward accomplishing case 
specificity, cost minimization, and equal best.10 My book, Foundations of 
Evidence Law, unfolds this interpretive claim.11 In this Article, I focus on 
the principles themselves while trying to refine and further develop my 
earlier account. Specifically, I explain how these principles integrate with 
substantive entitlements and liabilities and how they limit normative claims 
with respect to the law of evidence. 
The facts underlying legal disputes are inherently uncertain and courts 
consequently never know exactly what they are.12 Therefore, instead of 
trying to find the actual facts, courts determine what these facts are likely to 
be under conditions of uncertainty.13 The rules, known as the law of 
evidence, help courts make these determinations. These rules categorize 
 
6 This discussion refines and further develops the ideas presented in my book, ALEX STEIN, 
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (2005) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]. 
7 See id. at 91-106 (identifying the maximal individualization requirement). 
8 See id. at 141-43 (specifying the cost-efficiency requirement). 
9 See id. at 172-78, 214-25 (identifying the “equal best” requirement for factfinding in criminal 
and civil cases). 
10 Id. at 91-106, 143-67, 178-208, 225-44. 
11 Id. at ix-xiii, 133-40. 
12 Id. at 34-36. 
13 Id. 
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evidence as admissible or inadmissible.14 They also require corroboration for 
certain types of evidence and determine the burdens and standards of proof 
for factual findings.15 By doing all that, evidentiary rules allocate the risk of 
error—and the ensuing prospect of wrongful punishment, dispossession, 
deprivation, or denial of remedy—to one party or another.16 
Allocation of error brings probability theory, economics, and moral 
philosophy into play. Arguably, evidence doctrine must ensure that courts’ 
decisions are aligned with the canons of probability17 and satisfy the 
demands of both fairness and welfare maximization.18 Evidence doctrine, 
however, steers away from probabilistic calculus19 and direct welfare 
maximization;20 it is also far removed from the fairness ideas recommended 
by moral philosophers. For these reasons, it has been criticized for 
being economically ignorant,21 probabilistically irrational,22 and morally 
deficient.23 These critiques come exclusively from academic corners and 
they do not sit well with the actual practice of the law. Attorneys and judges 
do not perceive evidence doctrine as wicked or misguided.24 
 
14 See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 1 (3d ed. 2013) (“Evidence law is about the limits we 
place on the information juries hear.”). 
15 See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 443 & n.84 (2015). 
16 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 133-38. 
17 For a discussion of this claim, see WILLIAM TWINING & ALEX STEIN, EVIDENCE AND 
PROOF, at xxi-xxiv (William L. Twining & Alex Stein eds., 1992). 
18 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 757-58 (8th ed. 
2011) (positing that minimization of the aggregate cost of errors and error avoidance is a 
fundamental economic goal of procedural law); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 
(2012) (arguing that evidentiary rules should be reconfigured to incentivize socially optimal 
primary behavior); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1477 (1999) (arguing that evidence law should enhance social welfare through minimization 
of the total cost of error and error avoidance). 
19 See Alex Stein, Of Two Wrongs That Make a Right: Two Paradoxes of the Evidence Law and 
Their Combined Economic Justification, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1199, 1204 & n.6, 1205 (2001) (evaluating 
the current state of evidence law in which the burden of proof must be met on each element of a 
claim as opposed to a statistical analysis of the overall probability based on the multiplication 
principle). For an argument to the contrary and criticism leveled against it, compare Edward K. 
Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J. 1254 (2013), with Ronald J. Allen & 
Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013). 
20 Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 588-93. 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 See infra Part IV. 
24 See, e.g., Sidney A. Fitzwater, Opening Remarks, The Restyled Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1442 (2012) (“Rule 102 captures the purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence: ‘These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate 
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of 
ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.’ This Symposium is intended to celebrate 
the restyled Evidence Rules, which will enhance this lofty and salutary purpose.”). 
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I posit that the practitioners’ intuition is correct. Evidence doctrine does 
not ignore probability, economics, and moral theory. Yet, it also does not 
allow any of these disciplines to take over. Evidence doctrine is informed by 
a preselected, adapted, and integrated set of probabilistic, economic, and 
moral ideas, identified here as organizing principles. These principles are 
formulated and continually refined by common law courts as they go from 
case to case. They have a common goal: implementing people’s substantive 
entitlements and liabilities as fairly and as efficiently as possible. The 
organizing principles of evidence law thus fit themselves into the conceptual 
and operational framework of substantive entitlements and liabilities. 
This framework is decidedly second-personal: it conditions the grant of 
legal remedies and the imposition of penalties on the presence of authority, 
on one side, and accountability, on the other side.25 This framework 
authorizes a rightholder to impose punishment on or obtain compensation 
from a person who transgressed her entitlement.26 The plaintiff ’s authority 
and the defendant’s parallel accountability thus depend on the correctness 
of the plaintiff ’s infringement allegation against the defendant. For 
example, in order to succeed in a tort suit, a plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant carelessly caused her injury. The plaintiff consequently must 
adduce evidence identifying her injury, the defendant’s careless action, and 
the causal connection between the two. If convincing, this evidence would 
establish the plaintiff ’s legal authority over the defendant and make the 
defendant accountable to the plaintiff for the amount stipulated by the law. 
The defendant, for his part, may present evidence disassociating his actions 
from the plaintiff ’s injury or showing that those actions were careful 
enough. If convincing, this evidence would make the defendant unacc-
ountable and the plaintiff would then be denied the authority to extract 
compensation from the defendant. 
This second-personal framework defines the nature of factfinding in the 
courts of law. Adjudicative factfinding focuses exclusively on the parties’ 
authority–accountability relationship and on the story underlying that 
specific relationship. For that reason, it assumes the form of a contest 
 
25 See STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 5-9 (2006). 
26 See STEPHEN DARWALL, MORALITY, AUTHORITY, AND LAW: ESSAYS IN SECOND-
PERSONAL ETHICS I 135-39 (2013) (explaining this framework as the difference between an 
agent-neutral, or state-of-the-world-regarding, reason for acting and an agent-relative relationship 
in which there is authority to demand action second-personally). 
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between the plaintiff ’s (or the prosecutor’s) and the defendant’s stories.27 
Courts resolve those contests by applying the relative plausibility criterion, 
also called “inference to the best explanation.”28 Specifically, they determine 
which of the parties’ conflicting stories make the most sense in terms of 
coherence, consilience, causality, and evidential support.29 The story that 
scores the highest along these dimensions forms the factual base for 
ascribing liabilities and entitlements and for awarding remedies.30 
Second-personal factfinding is case specific by design: it requires 
evidence that reveals the specifics of the parties’ relationship. Without 
knowing these specifics, courts would not be able to determine whether the 
plaintiff has a valid authoritative demand that makes the defendant 
accountable to her. Courts consequently cannot rely on statistical evidence 
as their primary information. Because statistical distributions tell nothing 
about the plaintiff ’s authority over the defendant and the defendant’s 
accountability to the plaintiff, they are second-personally irrelevant. 
Factfinders, for example, cannot base a murder conviction upon evidence 
showing that the defendant was one of 1000 prisoners, of whom 999 
participated in a riot that killed prison guards.31 Statistical distributions, 
however, can still play a role as secondary information that helps courts 
evaluate case-specific evidence.32 For example, in evaluating case-specific 
testimony of an eyewitness, courts may take into account psychological 
studies identifying the general rate of eyewitness error.33 
 
27 See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 604, 
612-14 (1994) (analyzing the proper “allocation of ambiguity” between the plaintiff’s and 
defendant’s stories that should be applied by a factfinder); Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, 
Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 229-31 (2008) (arguing that the 
decisionmaking “process occurs in two steps: generating potential explanations of the evidence and 
then selecting the best explanation from the list of potential ones”).  
28 Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 567-71. 
29 Id. at 579.  
30 See id. (finding that these dimensions “trump frequentist probability in any individual 
case”). 
31 This example is borrowed from Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive 
Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1192-93 (1979). 
32 Cf. Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1991) (citing 
JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 21 (1950)) (explaining how jurors use experience-based 
credibility cues in evaluating testimony of witnesses). 
33 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 880 A.2d 288, 294-98 (Md. 2005) (invoking statistical incidence 
of errors in cross-racial identifications as a reason for quashing conviction of defendants that were 
prevented by the trial judge from drawing jurors’ attention to potential unreliability of white 
witnesses identifying black suspects as perpetrators). As Ronald Allen and I have observed, courts 
also rely on naked statistical evidence in special cases that involve (inter alia) “market-share 
liability for defective products, doctors’ liability for patients’ lost chances to recover from illness, 
employers’ liability for discriminating against classes of employees, trademark infringers’ liability 
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Consider the proverbial Blue Bus company that operates 80% of the 
buses in town and that has a competitor, Green Bus, that operates the 
remaining 20%.34 A person is injured by an unidentified bus in a hit-and-run 
accident that had no witnesses. Under such circumstances, the victim cannot 
validly claim that her probability of having been hit by a blue bus was 80%. 
Although statistically correct, this claim is not valid from a second-personal 
standpoint; all it can show is a distribution of multiple victims randomly hit 
by blue and green buses. The victim has no concrete account of the event in 
which she, as opposed to another victim, was wronged by a blue, as opposed 
to a green, bus. The victim consequently fails to establish her authority over 
the Blue Bus company. Nor can she prove that Blue Bus is accountable to 
her, as opposed to another victim.35 
The second-personal design of evidence doctrine also accounts for the 
doctrine’s economics. The doctrine confines factfinders’ inquiries to the 
specifics of the parties’ relationship. Due to this confinement, aptly 
 
for consumer confusion, and the election law protection against redistricting manipulations.” Allen 
& Stein, supra note 19, at 576. 
34 This example draws on Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945); see also 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 166-70 (2011) (using a similar example 
involving cabs in a psychological experiment). 
35 Cf. David Enoch et al., Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge, 40 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 197, 202-10 (2012) (using Timothy Williamson’s seminal account of 
“sensitivity” to explain the legal system’s rejection of naked statistical evidence) see TIMOTHY 
WILLIAMSON, KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 147-63 (2000); David Enoch & Talia Fisher, 
Sense and “Sensitivity”: Epistemic and Instrumental Approaches to Statistical Evidence, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. 557, 573-85 (2015). Arguably, the 80% probability supporting the plaintiff’s allegations 
against Blue Bus fails the “sensitivity” test because any addition of relevant evidence—for 
example, testimony that drivers working for Green Bus had a drinking party on the day of the 
accident—would change that probability quite dramatically. Under such circumstances, the 
factfinder’s belief that a blue bus caused the accident would be “insensitive” and hence unjustified 
because the factfinder would hold it even when it is factually untrue. The “sensitivity” test plays 
an important role in epistemology, see Williamson, supra, at 147-48, and in probability theory, but 
it adds very little to the understanding of the law of evidence as a body of rules that facilitate 
second-personal factfinding. To see why, take a reasonably sensitive belief in a statistical 
generalization that can also be conceptualized as “invariant” following ROBERT NOZICK, 
INVARIANCES: THE STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECTIVE WORLD 75-90, 99 (2001). Specifically, 
consider an economic expert who testifies in a corporate fraud trial that many CEOs working for 
publicly traded companies sacrifice their companies’ long-term interests in their pursuit of 
privately advantageous short-term gains. As a strictly statistical proposition, this testimony is 
unshakable. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2003, at 71 (explaining how prevalent executive-compensation 
structures induce self-seeking behavior). Under our evidence system, however, it would be 
inadmissible either because it is irrelevant or because it can show only the general propensity of 
average, as opposed to specific, CEOs. See FED. R. EVID. 402, 404(b). Such evidence fails the 
individualization test, see FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 91-106, and as such is incapable of 
supporting any second-personal claim against the CEO. 
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identified by Lon Fuller as monocentricity,36 courts are neither able nor 
authorized to make decisions that promote global welfare-maximization. All 
they can do is increase their chances of making an accurate decision in the 
case at bar at a socially affordable cost.37 In tune with that goal, the doctrine 
strives to make the factfinding system internally cost efficient. To that end, 
it sets up rules that minimize the cost of factfinding errors and the cost of 
avoiding those errors as a total sum.38 These rules take into account the risk 
of error and the value of what a party stands to lose in the event of an 
error.39 The greater the expected loss, the higher the level of protection 
against error that the party will receive under these rules.40 Whether this 
inner efficiency also improves social welfare is a separate macroeconomic 
question that the doctrine does not address. 
The doctrine’s commitment to case specificity and cost minimization 
also defines the extent to which it can implement moral principles. For 
example, the doctrine cannot implement the Kantian principle of desert41 
while satisfying its case-specificity and cost-minimization goals. Consider 
again the prisoners’ riot case that calls for an acquittal of all 1000 prisoners 
due to the absence of evidence identifying the crime’s perpetrators 
individually. This acquittal violates the desert principle because it 
purposefully allows 999 murderers to go unpunished. To avoid this 
violation, the court could convict all 1000 prisoners, including the innocent 
inmate. Alas, this verdict would also violate the desert principle (along with 
Kant’s “categorical imperative”)42 because it deliberately inflicts punishment 
on an innocent person. 
Evidence doctrine therefore has no choice but to limit its moral 
ambition. Fairness and morality are important, but case specificity and cost 
minimization are important as well. The doctrine consequently can promote 
fairness only within the given framework of the law. As I already explained, 
this framework requires courts to make case-specific decisions that minimize 
the total cost of error and error avoidance.43 Under these constraints, the 
 
36 See Lon Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 1, 3-7 
(1960) (distinguishing between monocentric and “polycentric” adjudication). 
37 Stein, supra note 15, at 428-29, 442.  
38 Id. at 443-44. 
39 Id. at 429-30. 
40 Id. 
41 See Don E. Scheid, Kant’s Retributivism, 93 ETHICS 262, 274 (1983) (“To treat an individual 
with the respect due him as a human being is to treat him according to his deserts . . . .”). 
42 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis 
White Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1959) (1785) (“Act only according to that maxim by which 
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”). 
43 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 91-106, 141-43. 
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only moral virtue that the doctrine can plausibly promote is “equal best.”44 
All it can do is afford every person the maximal feasible protection against 
risk of error while equalizing that protection across the board.45 
These three principles explain and justify all evidentiary rules that 
regulate factfinding in courts46 (except privileges that suppress evidence for 
purposes unrelated to factfinding)47. The common law rule that prohibits 
courts from basing their decisions on naked statistical evidence realizes the 
case-specificity principle.48 The rule suppressing evidence of a person’s 
character or propensity does the same (since character and propensity 
evidence is nakedly statistical).49 Burdens of proof, civil and criminal, 
implement the cost-minimization principle within the framework of equal 
best.50 Evidentiary presumptions try to achieve the same goal through 
adjustment of the general proof burdens.51 The rule against hearsay 
minimizes the cost of error-avoidance while also implementing the 
equal-best requirement.52 It does so by systematically suppressing one-
sided and untestable out-of-court statements that give their proponents an 
unfair advantage in the allocation of the risk of error. Rules determining the 
admissibility of expert evidence (both Frye53 and Daubert54) pursue cost 
minimization (albeit, with varying success). 
This understanding of the law of evidence has a number of implications 
for policy and scholarship. First and most important, evidentiary rules and 
substantive laws are integrated and codependent. The case-specificity 
requirement set up by our rules of evidence preserves the second-personal 
nature of substantive entitlements and liabilities. Evidentiary rules that 
work to achieve cost-minimization facilitate accurate, but cost-conscious, 
 
44 Id. at 172-78, 214-25. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 138-40. 
47 Because privileges protect substantive confidentiality entitlements, they are properly 
categorized as belonging to substantive law rather than the law of evidence. See John Hart Ely, 
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724-27 (1974) (attesting that immunities, 
which would include evidentiary privileges, belong to substantive law); Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen of Federal Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 
353, 373 (1969) (same). 
48 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 204-07, 238-40 (discussing the law’s preemption of 
decisions based on naked statistical evidence).  
49 Id. at 183-89. 
50 Id. at 143-53.  
51 See id. at 222-23 (discussing the role of the burden of proof in the equal-best framework). 
52 Id. at 189-96; see also Stein, supra note 15, at 444-50 (discussing the risks addressed by the 
hearsay rule).  
53 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
54 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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ascertainment of substantive liabilities and entitlements. Finally, rules of 
evidence that form the equal-best principle make sure that courts do not 
assign substantive liabilities and entitlements arbitrarily or through bias.  
The three principles of the law of evidence also impose limits on the 
claims that scholars can plausibly make about evidentiary rules. As far as 
normative theory is concerned, scholars may call for a revision and 
replacement of evidentiary rules that do not function properly in promoting 
case specificity, cost minimization, or equal best. From a descriptive 
standpoint, scholars may consider whether any of the three principles 
requires reformulation and refinement to produce a more accurate account 
of the law of evidence. Scholarly endeavors that go along these paths 
perceive legal doctrine as a system of interconnected evidentiary, 
procedural, and substantive rules that define people’s entitlements and 
liabilities. This integrated understanding of the law represents the “New 
Doctrinalism.” 
What scholars cannot plausibly do is promote an evidentiary reform that 
parts company with the three principles of the law of evidence. Any such 
reform will bring about distortions in the legal system. Abolition of the 
rules associated with the case-specificity principle would unravel the second-
personal structure of the substantive entitlements and liabilities. Repealing 
the rules that promote cost minimization is bound to create discrepancies 
between the courts’ factfinding efforts and the value of the underlying 
substantive entitlements and liabilities. Doing away with the equal-best 
principle would allow courts to use whim and bias in allocating the risk of 
error between the parties. 
My methodological injunction does not ban wholesale reform proposals 
that purport to remodel our entire legal system together with the three 
evidentiary principles. More often than not, such proposals are unrealistic 
and overambitious, but they can be normatively plausible, and I am not 
criticizing them in this Article. I argue against theories of evidence that 
make no attempt to understand our legal system from the perspective of an 
informed insider who sees the connections between the system’s different 
rules and what those rules collectively aim to achieve. These theories 
anomalously purport to remodel our system of evidence while holding the 
substantive law constant. In what follows, I call this wrong-headed 
methodology “antidoctrinalism.” In Parts II, III, and IV below, I 
demonstrate how antidoctrinalism plagues a number of economic, 
probabilistic, and moral theories of evidence that otherwise appear 
attractive. 
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II. ECONOMIC ANTIDOCTRINALISM 
The most recent and by far most salient example of economic 
antidoctrinalism in the area of evidence is Louis Kaplow’s ambitious 
proposal to redesign the burden of proof.55 Kaplow argues that the burden 
of proof doctrine is fundamentally flawed in that it has “almost nothing to 
do with what matters for society.”56 Probability thresholds set by this 
doctrine—“preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” and “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”57—represent different levels of accuracy for factual 
findings. For civil actions, preponderance of the evidence will suffice.58 For 
findings that lead to a deprivation of the defendant’s civil right, the law 
normally requires clear and convincing evidence.59 Criminal prosecutors will 
only obtain conviction when the defendant’s guilt is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.60 According to Kaplow, this pursuit of “accuracy ex post” 
is futile because it has no effect upon actors’ primary behavior.61 Based on 
this observation, Kaplow calls on lawmakers to do away with accuracy ex 
post.62 He recommends that lawmakers replace the burden of proof doctrine 
with factfinding mechanisms that incentivize socially desirable conduct. 
To operationalize this idea, Kaplow develops a novel legal mechanism 
that uses “evidence thresholds.”63 Evidence that goes into Kaplow’s 
thresholds integrates information about the systemic effects of the relevant 
primary activity: harmful, socially useful, and benign.64 This evidence 
associates different activities with different concentrations of harm and 
benefit. Some of those concentrations yield a socially negative tradeoff, 
others do not. Based on this evidence, the legal system should penalize 
activities associated with the undesirable concentrations of harm versus 
benefit.65 Probabilities upon which actors will receive those penalties will 
vary as well. When the harm in the mix predominates, the system will 
decrease the probability upon which courts can find a person responsible for 
 
55 See generally Kaplow, supra note 18. 
56 Id. at 789. 
57 Id. at 742-44. 
58 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 221-23. 
59 Id. at 152-53 (“[C]laims and contentions that require proof by clear and convincing 
evidence include allegations of fraud and deprivations of civil liberties.”). 
60 Id. at 148-51. 
61 See Kaplow, supra note 18, at 784-89 (arguing that his proposed proof system is more finely 
tuned to social welfare because of its emphasis on factor analysis as opposed to ex post accuracy). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 756-62. 
64 Id. at 757. 
65 Id. 
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the underlying misconduct and the ensuing harm.66 Conversely, as the harm 
in the mix subsides, the probability that courts will require for finding the 
actor liable will get higher.67 Kaplow argues that these multiple rules 
outperform the conventional burden of proof doctrine at promoting social 
utility.68  
From a purely economic standpoint, Kaplow’s model is normatively 
appealing (subject to the cost problem that he addresses, but does not 
completely resolve).69 The economic standpoint, however, is too abstract. It 
pays no regard to the structure and substance of our legal system. First and 
most importantly, Kaplow ignores the second-personal nature of legal 
entitlements and liabilities. Under his model, instead of relying on the 
authority–accountability relationship between individual plaintiffs and 
defendants, courts determine people’s liabilities and entitlements on the 
basis of general social facts. These social facts are statistical distributions 
unrelated to the parties’ concrete behavior. Decisions that courts would 
make under Kaplow’s model would consequently violate the case-specificity 
principle. 
This model also violates the equal-best principle. It does so by 
systematically discriminating against defendants whose activities fall into 
the socially disfavored concentrations of benefit versus harm. Under 
Kaplow’s model, the level of protection against error that a person receives 
does not depend on whether she is a civil or criminal defendant and on the 
value of the entitlement that she might undeservedly lose in court. Instead, 
it depends on how good or bad the social consequences of a person’s actions 
are in a statistical sense.  
Kaplow’s model is also completely unrelated to the conventional 
principle of cost minimization. This model incorporates a new mechanism 
of entitlements and liabilities that tracks statistical concentrations of harms 
versus benefits.70 This mechanism tries to accomplish a whole lot more than 
reconfigure the burden-of-proof doctrine. Implementing it would redesign 
our entire legal system. Presently, whether an actor is liable or not depends 
on whether his conduct aligns with the requisite legal rule or standard. This 
factual question, in turn, depends on whether the misconduct allegation 
against the actor is sufficiently probable. When the allegation is criminal, its 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 782-86. 
69 See Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 563-65, 580-83 (critiquing Kaplow’s theory on a 
number of bases, including its enormous informational costs). 
70 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 756-61 (explaining the “evidence thresholds” framework). 
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probability must be high enough to eliminate “all reasonable doubt.”71 And 
when the alleged misconduct is civil, as in tort or contract cases, it must be 
“more probable than not”72 (and in some special cases it must be verified by 
“clear and convincing evidence”)73. This conventional system minimizes the 
cost of adjudicative errors and the cost of accuracy as a total sum.74  
Under Kaplow’s system, on the other hand, whether an actor should be 
liable or not depends on the statistical zone into which her conduct falls. 
Each statistical zone represents a discrete concentration of harms and 
benefits: positive (when the benefits are greater than the harms), negative 
(when the harms are greater than the benefits), or neutral (when the harms 
and the benefits are equal).75 When the zone into which the actor’s conduct 
falls is neutral, evidence that her specific conduct was harmful must show 
preponderance. Harm originating from the actor’s conduct must consequently 
be more probable than not.76 When the zone is positive, the requisite 
evidence must achieve a high degree of probability: somewhere between 
clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt.77 And when the zone is 
negative, the requisite evidence needs to show probability below these levels 
and, in appropriate cases, even below preponderance.78 This Bayesian 
insight79 reveals the enormous cost that society incurs by requiring 
prosecutors to prove criminal accusations beyond a reasonable doubt.80 
According to Kaplow, the “beyond reasonable doubt standard” is inimical to 
social welfare.81 He is not the first to make that accusation.82  
 
71 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 148-51, 178-83. 
72 Id. at 124-33. 
73 Id. at 152-53. 
74 Id. at 141-43. 
75 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 756-62. 
76 Id. at 763-68. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 See Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 584-88 (explaining and criticizing the Bayesian 
rationale of Kaplow’s “evidence thresholds” system); see also Louis Kaplow, Likelihood Ratio Tests 
and Legal Decision Rules, 16 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1 (2014) (explaining Bayesian foundations of 
proposed method for making legal decisions). 
80 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 744 (“[S]tricter proof burdens can, in plausible settings, increase 
rather than decrease the number of false convictions, and the presence of higher social costs of 
sanctions likewise has ambiguous implications regarding whether the proof burden should be 
higher or lower.”); see also id. at 790-91. 
81 Id. at 744, 790-91. 
82 See generally Larry Laudan, Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?, 9 LEGAL THEORY 295 (2003) 
(arguing that the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement is dysfunctional); Larry Laudan, Is 
it Finally Time to Put ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ Out to Pasture? (Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Series No. 194, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815321 (criticizing the 
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Kaplow’s system therefore represents an entirely new, welfare-driven, 
substantive law. Unlike the conventional doctrine that focuses upon 
evidence and how to use it in order to minimize the overall cost of 
adjudicative error and error avoidance, this system fits itself into a big 
picture of social welfare, which it tries to maximize directly.83 This direct 
approach to welfare maximization eliminates the doctrinal structures that 
try to improve social welfare indirectly through the familiar mechanisms of 
rights, duties, liabilities, and burdens of proof. Implementing it would 
substitute our legal system with a different one. 
Kaplow’s suggestion that our system is actually broken and needs to be 
fixed is doubtful. Kaplow complains that the system ignores concentrations 
of harm versus benefit and their importance. My view of the system is more 
charitable. As Ronald Allen and I have shown in a recent work, 
concentrations of harm versus benefit animate our system’s substantive rules 
of civil and criminal liability.84 Kaplow criticizes the burden of proof 
doctrine for being oblivious to these concentrations and their implications 
for social welfare, but this critique pays no regard to the substantive rules of 
tort, contract, and criminal liability that the doctrine was set up to 
implement. Our burden of proof rules operate in tandem with the 
substantive rules of liability. They do so by setting up the probability 
thresholds that courts use in ascertaining the presence of characteristics that 
make a person’s conduct prohibited (and hence socially undesirable) or 
permitted (and hence socially desirable or neutral). Those thresholds 
determine the level of enforcement for liability rules and where the risk of 
erroneous enforcement should fall.85 Kaplow pays no attention to this 
synergy. He analyzes the burden of proof doctrine as a freestanding set of 
rules and, unsurprisingly, produces a descriptively distorted account of the 
doctrine. 
 
wrongful conviction versus wrongful acquittal tradeoff contemplated by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard). 
83 See Allen & Stein, supra note 19, at 588-93 ( juxtaposing Kaplow’s direct approach to 
welfare maximization against the indirect approach taken by positive law). 
84 Id. 
85 These rules still have certain undesirable effects on actors’ primary behavior. See generally 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on Primary Behavior, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 518 (2010) (demonstrating that evidentiary motivations lead actors to engage in 
“socially suboptimal behavior when doing so is likely to increase their chances of prevailing in 
court”). 
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III. PROBABILISTIC ANTIDOCTRINALISM 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky are renowned psychologists and 
behavioral economists,86 who claim to have uncovered systematic flaws in 
people’s evaluations of probability. One of their most famous claims 
criticizes the factfinding method followed by our courts of law. This claim 
originates from the robust experiment known as “Blue Cab.”87  
Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators told factfinders about a hit-
and-run accident that occurred at night in a city in which 85% of cabs were 
blue and 15% were green. They also told the factfinders that the hit-and-run 
victim filed a lawsuit against the companies operating those cabs—identified 
respectively as “Blue Cab” and “Green Cab”—and that an eyewitness 
testified in the ensuing trial that the cab that hit the victim was green. 
Another piece of information that the factfinders received concerned a 
rather unusual procedure that took place at this trial. The experimenters 
told the participants that “[the judge] tested the witness’ ability to 
distinguish between Blue and Green cabs under nighttime visibility 
conditions [and] found that the witness was able to identify each color 
correctly about 80% of the time but confused it with the other color about 
20% of the time.”88 Based on this information, factfinders estimated that the 
probability that a green cab hit the victim was 0.8.89 Remarkably, this 
assessment squarely aligns with the preponderance of the evidence 
requirement for civil suits. 
Under Bayes’ Theorem, however, things are markedly different. The 
prior odds that the responsible cab was green as opposed to blue, 
P(G)/P(B), equaled 0.15/0.85. To calculate the posterior odds, 
P(G|W)/P(B|W), with W denoting the credibility of the witness, these 
odds had to be multiplied by the likelihood ratio. This ratio is equal to the 
odds attaching to the scenario in which the witness identified the cab’s color 
correctly, rather than incorrectly: P(W|G)/P(W|B). The posterior odds 
consequently equaled (0.15 × 0.8)/(0.85 × 0.2)—that is, 12/17. The 
probability that the victim’s allegation against the Green Cab is true thus 
amounted to 12/(17 + 12) or 0.41—far below the “preponderance of the 
 
86 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003) (recounting Kahneman’s Noble Prize lecture 
summarizing his work with the late Amos Tversky). 
87 KAHNEMAN, supra note 34, at 166-70 (presenting the “Blue Cab” experiment); see also 
Maya Bar-Hillel, The Base-Rate Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 44 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 211, 
211-12 (1980) (same). 
88 See Bar-Hillel, supra note 87, at 211-12.  
89 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 34, at 167. 
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evidence standard” (> 0.5) that applies in civil litigation. Based on this 
insight, Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators claimed to have 
established a mismatch between the factfinders’ cognition and the real 
probability.90 
Similarly to Kaplow’s abstract model of the burden of proof, this 
argument is strikingly antidoctrinal. Begin with the second-personal 
framework of the trial. Under that framework, the fact that 85% of the cabs 
in town are blue rather than green is of no consequence. Whether the 
defendant’s cab hit the plaintiff has nothing to do with that statistical 
distribution. Correspondingly, the case-specificity principle holds that 
factfinders should disregard this piece of information.  
What is of consequence is the witness who saw the accident and who 
says that the cab that hit the victim was green. The fact that the witness 
correctly identifies cab colors 80% of the time is also relevant. As I already 
explained, factfinders can use such evidence as second-order information in 
assessing the credibility of the primary evidence (the witness’s testimony). 
The distribution of cabs in town, on the other hand, cannot be used as 
credibility evidence because an ordinary person can tell green from blue 
even when she is accustomed to seeing one green cab and many blue cabs. 
The plaintiff ’s case-specific story, corroborated by the eyewitness, 
consequently wins the plausibility contest. In numerical terms, this story 
has an 80% probability of being true, precisely as estimated by the 
factfinders. 
For Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators, the “case-specificity” 
principle and the whole idea of second-personal factfinding make no sense. 
The fact that participants in their “Blue Cab” experiment followed an 
established legal doctrine is equally immaterial. The only thing that 
mattered was the Bayes’ Theorem violation. For Kahneman, Tversky, and 
other behavioral economists, a person can only be rational when she follows 
that theorem. When a person violates that theorem, she is irrational, by 
definition. 
This narrow understanding of probabilistic rationality brushes aside the 
causative probability system that underlies the case-specificity principle.91 
As a normative matter, the Blue Cab case can be analyzed under two 
distinct analytical frameworks: mathematical and causative.92 The 
mathematical framework uses Bayes’ Theorem, whose application gives the 
 
90 Id. 
91 See Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Foundation of Law and Economics, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 199, 200-04 (2011). 
92 Id. at 253-56.  
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victim’s case a 0.41 probability (if we ignore some additional problems with 
the “Blue Cab” experiment). This probability represents the errant cab’s 
chances of being green rather than blue, with a cab-identifying witness 
scoring 80 out of 100 on similar identifications in a town in which 85% of 
the cabs are blue and 15% are green. The causative framework, on the other 
hand, yields an altogether different result, close to the mathematical 
probability of the witness’s accuracy (0.8). Under this framework, an event’s 
probability corresponds to the quantum and variety of the evidence that 
confirms the event’s occurrence while eliminating rival scenarios.93 This 
qualitative criterion separates causative probability and the case-specific 
stories to which it attaches from the mathematical calculus of chances.94 
Under this criterion, the eyewitness’s testimony that the errant cab was 
green was credible enough to rule out the “errant blue cab” scenario as 
causatively implausible. On the other hand, the distribution of blue and 
green cabs in the given town had no proven effect on the eyewitness’s 
capacity to tell blue from green. The eyewitness’s testimony consequently 
overrides the cab-color statistics. 
Remarkably, Kahneman, Tversky, and their collaborators do not even say 
what the legal system would gain if factfinders were to follow Bayes’ 
Theorem. To find out, consider one hundred cases similar to the “Blue Cab” 
scenario and assume that factfinders abandon the case-specificity principle 
and follow Bayes’ Theorem instead. They determine that the suit’s 
probability in each case equals 0.41 and dismiss each and every of the one 
hundred suits for failure to establish preponderance. Contrary to the 
implicit assumption of Kahneman, Tversky, and other behavioral 
economists, the factfinders would not deliver 59 correct decisions out of 100. 
Instead, they would deliver only 20 correct decisions and 80 erroneous 
verdicts. Their rate of errors would track the number of color 
misidentifications by the eyewitness. As I already explained, this number 
will remain unaffected by the fact that 85% of the cabs in town are blue and 
only 15% are green. For that reason, if factfinders were to apply Bayes’ 
Theorem in violation of the case-specificity requirement, they would 
increase the cost of error instead of decreasing it.95  
The cost-minimization principle thus also requires factfinders to ignore 
the cab-color statistic and base their decisions on the eyewitness’s testimony 
 
93 Id. at 243-46. 
94 Id. at 235-46. 
95 For further critique of Tversky and Kahneman’s claim that people systematically make 
probabilistically irrational decisions, see Alex Stein, Are People Probabilistically Challenged?, 111 
MICH. L. REV. 855 (2013) (book review). 
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alone. The cab-color statistic can only increase, rather then decrease, the 
prospect of error in the factfinders’ decision because it has no causal 
connection to the plaintiff ’s story. The fact that Green Cab owns only 150 
out of 1000 cabs in town does not integrate in any causally meaningful way 
with the eyewitness’s testimony: “I saw the cab that injured the plaintiff, 
and it was green.” Behavioral economists call the factfinders’ decision for 
the plaintiff a “base rate neglect,” but we could equally see it as according 
overriding power to evidence of causes and effects. Evidence doctrine 
systematically prefers causative evidence to naked statistics because it aims 
at getting courts closer to the truth. We live in a world of causes and effects.  
Consider the disruption that our criminal justice system would endure if 
it cared about base rates. Take a sophisticated crime—say, counterfeiting 
United States currency—that only one person out of a million can 
successfully carry out. Assume that two independent eyewitnesses identify 
Rick as a successful counterfeiter. Assume further that each of those 
witnesses was tested for credibility and, as in the “Blue Cab” scenario, was 
found to give a completely truthful description of what she saw 80% of the 
time. The two witnesses thus give factfinders a very high aggregated 
probability of the defendant’s guilt: 0.96 [0.8+0.8-(0.8x0.8)]. Assume that 
this probability satisfies the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  
At this point, the defendant asks the factfinders to factor in the 
1/1,000,000 base rate, which should lead to his immediate acquittal. The 
prosecutor protests. She says that with this base rate any criminal trial 
would be a waste of time and resources, to which the defendant responds, 
“This is exactly my point. Can I go now?” Fortunately for all of us, the 
defendant cannot go scot-free. Our legal system does not allow factfinders 
to rely on base rates that have no causal connection to case-specific 
evidence.96 
IV. MORAL ANTIDOCTRINALISM 
Ronald Dworkin’s important essay, Principle, Policy, Procedure, originally 
appeared in the Festschrift honoring the late Sir Rupert Cross, one of the 
 
96 Consider in this connection Hume’s criticism of the base-rate neglect that appears in his 
famous essay on miracles. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES: CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
AND CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 109-31 (P.H. Nidditch ed., Oxford Univ. 
Press 3d ed. 1975) (1777). Critically, although Hume’s distrust of miracle-tellers alludes to general 
probability, what makes those witnesses untrustworthy are the laws of nature rather than statistical 
distributions. For a superb analysis of Hume’s essay, see David Owen, Hume Versus Price on 
Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation, 37 PHIL. Q. 187 (1987).  
  
2104 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 2085 
 
world’s finest doctrinal scholars of evidence.97 This essay was nonetheless 
theoretical, rather than doctrinal, and it also was Dworkin’s first and only 
contribution to the field of evidence.98 The newcomer status did not prevent 
Dworkin from spotting and attempting to resolve one of the field’s most 
fundamental questions: What is the right way to deal with the risk of error 
in factfinding?99 
To resolve this question, Dworkin distinguished between two kinds of 
injustice: accidental and deliberate.100 Accidental injustice occurs when a 
person’s entitlement—say, the right to be cleared of criminal charges or 
allegations of negligence—deserves to be upheld, but the court denies that 
entitlement to the person based on the available evidence.101 The available 
evidence unequivocally identifies the person as guilty even though he is 
factually innocent. The gap between the evidence and the true facts, for 
which the court is not accountable, makes the resulting injustice accidental 
rather than deliberate. The court’s decision does not purport to convict a 
person identified by the evidence as actually or possibly innocent.102  
Arguably, Dworkin’s distinction is untidy because making the adjudicative 
system more meticulous about factfinding could narrow the gap between the 
evidence and the truth. For Dworkin, however, this objection is beside the 
point because it is not strong enough to recharacterize an accidental act of 
injustice that does not target any specific individual for a deliberate denial 
of right. Under Dworkin’s theory, setting up a cost-conscious system of 
adjudication that accidentally denies people their dues is morally justified.103 
Dworkin explains that societal resources are scarce and there is no 
overriding moral imperative which demands their channeling into court 
proceedings, as opposed to health, education, highways, border patrol, and 
other social amenities. Citizens benefiting from those amenities may 
occasionally be harmed by the underfunded system of adjudication. This 
 
97 Ronald Dworkin, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT: 
ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF SIR RUPERT CROSS 193-225 (Colin Tapper ed., 1981). 
98 RONALD A. DWORKIN, Principle, Policy, Procedure, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72-103 
(1985). 
99 See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 12-25 (arguing that allocation of the risk of error is a 
principal objective of evidence law). This argument was first made in Alex Stein, The Law of 
Evidence and the Problem of Risk Distribution (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of London) (on file with London University Senate) and subsequently developed in 
Alex Stein, The Refoundation of Evidence Law, 9 CAN. J. LAW & JURISPRUDENCE 279 (1996). 
100 DWORKIN, supra note 98, at 79-88. 
101 Id. at 84-85. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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system may accidentally work against a person by unintentionally producing 
an erroneous decision that deprives her of her legal entitlement. Such an 
outcome, as regrettable as it may be, is morally indistinguishable from a 
traffic accident resulting from poor maintenance of the road.104 
According to Dworkin, deliberate injustice is different.105 Rather than 
being impersonal, this injustice is always directed against a known victim.106 
Consider a criminal case in which the evidence casts strong suspicion on the 
defendant but also shows that he may have not committed the alleged 
crime. In any such case, if the court decides to ignore the exonerating 
potential of the evidence and deliver a guilty verdict, it would produce 
deliberate injustice.107  
Consider now a tort action in which a quadriplegic plaintiff blames his 
injury on a motorcycle crash that, according to him, resulted from his 
motorcycle’s malfunctioning suspension system.108 The plaintiff asks the 
court to find the motorcycle’s manufacturer responsible for his injury. To 
prove his allegation, the plaintiff calls an accident expert to testify about 
fifty similar accidents and about the fact that, after these accidents, the 
manufacturer developed a new and safer motorcycle model.109 The court 
decides to suppress this evidence. Other evidence does not make the 
plaintiff ’s case more probable than not, and the jury rules for the defendant. 
Here, too, the injustice suffered by the plaintiff is deliberate rather than 
accidental because the evidence suppressed by the court could prove the 
alleged motorcycle defect. As Bentham famously put it, when you exclude 
such probative evidence, “you exclude justice.”110 
Both of my examples involve a sacrifice of a person’s actual or potential 
entitlement for some general societal good. In the criminal case, the court 
overrides a reasonable doubt for a reason: the alternative—acquittal of a 
person who likely committed the alleged crime—would pose a danger to 
society. In the tort action, the court suppresses evidence of the new 
motorcycle design because its admission might discourage manufacturers 
from making similar improvements. Under Dworkin’s theory, neither of 
those sacrifices is justified because they force the individual to pay more 
than she should under the general utilitarian tradeoff underlying our 
 
104 Id. at 84-87. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 This example draws on Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1984). 
109 See id. at 468. 
110 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE: SPECIALLY APPLIED 
TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 1 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1995) (1827). 
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imperfect—but affordable—system of adjudication and its accidental errors. 
Those sacrifices are morally wrong because they are deliberate but not only 
for that reason. The fact that those sacrifices are deliberately imposed on an 
individual person also places them outside the permitted scope of the 
courts’ random errors. The person who endures the sacrifice pays an extra 
tax on top of the courts’ accidental errors to which she and everyone else are 
exposed. This extra tax violates Dworkin’s fundamental principle: the state’s 
duty to treat individuals with equal concern and respect.111 
This principle is antidoctrinal. It pays no regard to the second-personal 
framework of substantive entitlements and liabilities within which parties 
raise competing claims of authority and accountability. These claims play a 
zero-sum game against each other. As under Hohfeld’s system of jural 
relations,112 when a plaintiff provides enough evidence to establish his legal 
authority over the defendant, the defendant becomes accountable to the 
plaintiff.113 Conversely, when the defendant’s evidence undermines the 
plaintiff ’s claim of authority, it establishes the defendant’s unaccountability. 
For that reason, when a criminal court finds a reasonable doubt that 
overrides the probability of the defendant’s guilt and mandates his acquittal, 
it deliberately sacrifices the interests of crime victims, actual and potential. 
These victims consequently acquire a viable claim that they are as entitled 
as the defendant to equal concern and respect.  
Turning to my second example, if the court were to allow the injured 
plaintiff to adduce the proffered evidence of subsequent remedial measures, 
it would expose the motorcycle’s manufacturer to the risk of error. The 
manufacturer’s safety improvement may not have originated from its 
acknowledgement of a defect in the motorcycle’s previous model. 
Factfinders nonetheless might interpret it as an implied admission that the 
plaintiff ’s motorcycle had a defective suspension system. This decision 
would wrongfully establish the manufacturer’s accountability to the 
plaintiff. The manufacturer, of course, will object to that deliberate sacrifice. 
Specifically, the manufacturer will submit that it, too, deserves equal 
concern and respect. 
The crime victims’ and the manufacturer’s demands for equal concern 
and respect create a stalemate that renders Dworkin’s model inoperative. 
This stalemate is not accidental. Adjudication that takes place under 
 
111 DWORKIN, supra note 98, at 84-87. 
112 See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS 
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 11-31 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919) (defining and 
systematizing jural relations). 
113 DARWALL, supra note 26, at 135-39. 
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conditions of uncertainty inevitably causes moral injustice to one party or 
another.114 Dworkin’s model cannot protect one party against moral injustice 
without inflicting a similar injustice on her opponent.115 
This structural constraint explains the cost-minimization principle and 
its comprehensive adoption by our legal system. The cost-minimization 
principle authorizes courts to convict defendants on a high probability of 
guilt that need not completely rule out the possibility of innocence. The 
cost-minimization principle also justifies the suppression of subsequent 
remedial measures. As far as implied admissions are concerned, such 
evidence cuts both ways. At the same time, allowing courts to use it would 
interfere with manufacturers’ businesses and discourage them from 
introducing safety improvements. Dworkin’s attempt at insulating our 
evidence system from cost–benefit calculations therefore falls apart. Our 
system can afford litigants no special protection against risk of error. All it 
can do is minimize the total cost of errors and error avoidance while 
equalizing the protection against errors across criminal defendants and 
parties to civil suits.116  
CONCLUSION 
My mentor, William Twining, posited that “healthy discourse involves a 
constant interaction between relative generality and relative particularity.”117 
Antidoctrinal theories of law, both critical and constructive, involve no such 
interactions. These theories proceed from abstract normative premises—
moral, economic, epistemological, and probabilistic—from which they 
develop top-down criticism and recommendations in the hopes to advance 
the understanding of the law and guide its reform. These theories, however, 
do not take doctrine and doctrinal practice seriously. For them, doctrine is 
merely a compilation of rudimentary meanings of relevant legal rules. This 
methodological standpoint ignores the rules’ synergies, structural 
interdependence, and organizing ideas. Antidoctrinal theories thus can 
develop valuable insights only in the areas of morality, economics, 
epistemology, and probability. They offer no such insights for the law. 
 
114 FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 12-17. 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 172-78, 214-19. 
117 WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE 343 (1990). 
